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STUDENT ARTICLE
The Price Of Emission: Will Liability
Insurance Cover Damages Resulting From
Global Warming?
By Noel C. Paul*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Supreme Court's holding in Massachusetts
v. E.P.A1, it has become increasingly clear that US federal courts may
soon experience a significant increase in litigation over global warming.2 For oil companies, utilities, and automakers - the most likely
targets of such suits - one of the most vital legal questions left unaddressed is whether their insurance will cover resulting damages. 3 The
stakes are very high, not only in light of the potential for enormous
corporate liability, but because of the central role these industries
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'Massachusetts v. EPA, 2007 WL 95733 (U.S. 2007).
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Jonathan H. Adler, Hot Times in the High Court: Ruling could drive climate-

change policy for years to come, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, APRIL 3, 2007, availat
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NmUOZDBmMmEwZTlkNDBm
able
OTQ3ZTg OYzY5MTM3OTIwNTg (last visited May 16, 2007).
3 For discussion of most vulnerable industries see generally Jeffrey Ball,
Conoco Calls for Emissions Cap, WALL STREET J., April 11, 2007, A3; for evi-

dence of significance of insurance regarding global warming, see Mealey's Global
Warming Insurance Litigation Conference, June 6, 2007, conference information
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/conferences/LegalConference.aspx?cid

60480. (last visited May 16, 2007).
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play in the national and global economy. 4
This article, therefore, aims to provide a fuller understanding
of the issues related to insurance coverage for liabilities resulting
from global warming. Section II of this article briefly describes the
growing interest and concern over global warming in the public and
among potentially liable corporations. Section III canvases the state
and federal court cases related to global warming litigation and discusses the theories of liability asserted by plaintiffs. Section IV discusses historical efforts by insurance companies to exclude coverage
for environmental pollution. Secti3n V analyzes whether these exclusions will block coverage for companies found liable for global
warming. Section VI of this article discusses the impact on consumers of courts' decisions regarding insurance coverage for global
warming. Section VII provides a brief conclusion. Overall, this article concludes that most companies' Commercial General Liability
("CGL") policies will provide coverage for liabilities resulting from
contributions to global warming, and that coverage for these liabilities will ultimately benefit consumers.
II. DISCUSSION OF PUBLIC OPINION AND
CORPORATE RESPONSE
The energy industry must consistently address severe threats
to its short and long-term stability - from political instability and terrorism, to the influence of cartels and limited product supply. 5 Yet
the phenomenon of global warming, 6 and the political and social upheavals resulting therefrom, 7arguably pose the greatest threat to the
industry over the long term. While some scientists and advocacy

4id.
5 Peter Coy, The Trouble With Gushing Oil Demand,BuS1NESSWEEK, Apr. 26,

2004,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_17
/b3880054.htm.
6 Global warming is a scientific phenomenon in which Chlorofluorocarbons,
methane, and CO 2 (greenhouse gases) allow visible light to pass through the atmosphere, but also trap heat radiated back from the Earth as infrared rays. The net
effect is global warming. The concentration of CO 2 in the atmosphere has increased by about 30 percent since the mid-1 8 th century. Scientists generally agree
that human activities have caused the -'apid increase in CO 2 concentration. Fossil
fuel combustion releases CO 2, with coal releasing about twice as much energy as
natural gas, and oil somewhere between coal and gas. Robert Percival, et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy, pp. 1122-23 (Third Edition 2000).
7 John Carey & Lorraine Woellert, Global Warming: Here Come The Lawyers,
BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 30, 2006 [hereinafter The Lawyers].
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groups have pointed to the dangers of global warming for several
decades, energy companies have historically disclaimed responsibility and admonished against shoddy science and snap political deci-

sions. Yet anecdotal evidence suggests a sharp rise in global warming coverage in the media, and broader discussion of the issue in
popular culture. 9 Public opinion polls, moreover, reveal a significant
up-tick in public awareness regarding global warming, and an in-

crease in public unease.'0
Energy companies appear to have taken notice. Consider
Exxon Mobil's response in early 2007 to a report by the Union of
Concerned Scientists. l"
The organization's paper accused Exxon
Mobil of distorting the public debate over global warming in a fashion similar to tobacco companies' tactics during the 1990s. 12 Exxon
Mobil first responded by calling the report an "attempt to smear our
name and confuse the discussion."' 3 Twenty minutes later, however,
the company withdrew its statement and issued a shocking revision.
"It is clear today," the press release stated, "that greenhouse gas
emissions are one of the factors that contribute to climate change, and

8

Jerry Adler, 'Greenwashing Oil', NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 2007, available at

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16475341/site/newsweek/.
2007)

(last visited May 16,

9 Westlaw's "All News" database returns 6,608 articles published the past year
with "global warming" in the headline - nearly double the 3,390 published the year
prior. The considerable success of Al Gore's documentary film and book "An Inconvenient Truth" also, perhaps, points to growing public interest and awareness
regarding the issue. The film is one of the highest grossing documentaries of all
time, having earned more than $48 million; the book sat atop the New York Times
Bestseller's list during the summer of 2006 and is currently 2 3 rd. See William J.
Broad, From a Rapt Audience, a Call to Cool the Hype, N. Y. TIMES, March 13,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/science/13gore.html?
ex=l 176177600&en=a6deO9dlbe443ael&ei=5070 (subscription needed); see generally Best Sellers, N. Y. TIMES, available at http://www.nytimes.com/pages/books/
bestseller/ (follow hyperlink to "Paperback Nonfiction"; then follow hyperlink to
"Complete Paperback Nonfiction List".
10 A Jan. 30 Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll reported that 82 percent of
those asked "Do you believe global warming exists?" responded "yes" - a 5 percent increase from Oct. 25, 2005; A Jan. 18, 2007 CBS News Poll found that 70
percent of those asked believe global warming is an environmental problem causing a serious impact now - a 3 percent jump over the previous six months, available at http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm.
11Adler, supra note 8.
12

id

13id.

2007]

Price of Emission

471

'14
that the use of fossil fuels is a major source of these emissions.
The company's CEO has since stated that technological advances and
a global political strategy are necessary to combat the rise in carbon
dioxide ("C0 2 ") emissions. 15
Shortly after the Massachusetts decision by the Supreme
Court, oil titan ConocoPhillips became the first US oil company to
call for a federal global-warming emission cap. 16 The move resulted,
analysts said, from mounting political and consumer concern about
global warming and rising gasoline prices. 1 7 European-based oil giant BP had earlier endorsed adopting a similar cap.' 8 This dramatic
about-face by some of the most vocal critics of mandatory reductions
of CO 2 emissions no doubt results, in part, from a growing scientific
consensus that human activities are largely responsible for global
warming. 19 But it is also likely rooted in a more specific trend: a
spike in global warming-related litigation.20 At least 16 cases related
to global warming are pending in state and federal courts.2' Each
seeks, through a variety of legal theories, a legal acknowledgement of
global warming, and either government action or monetary damages.2 2 For example, 14 plaintiffs brought a class action suit last year
against 8 oil companies, 100 unnamed oil companies, and 31 coal
companies for damages to their property resulting from Hurricane
Katrina. 2 3 They contend that CO2 emissions resulting from these
companies' products contributed significantly to global warming,
which intensified or otherwise affected Hurricane Katrina. 24 The
State of California, conversely, is seeking billions of dollars in dam-

14

Id.

Dan Piller, Exxon leader: 'Climate getting warmer', FORT-WORTH STAR
Feb. 13, 2007.
16 Jeffrey Ball, Conoco Calls for Emissions Cap, WALL STREET J., April 11,
"

TELEGRAM,

2007, at A3.
17
18

Id
Id

19 Elizabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Calls Global

Warming 'Unequivocal',N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2007, at Al.
20 The Lawyers, supra note 7.
21

Justin R. Pidot, Global Warming In The Courts: An Overview of Current

Litigation and Common Legal Issues,
(2006).
22 Id.

GEORGETOWN ENV. LAW & POL. INST.,

23

Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 2006 WL 1066645 (S.D. Miss. 2006).

24

Id. at 1.
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ages from 6 automobile manufacturers, arguing that these companies
are responsible for significant amounts of CO 2 emissions. 25 According to its complaint, California's injuries include the melting of its
snow pack, the loss of water supply, a greater risk of flooding, and
The Supreme Court's
the loss of coastline, among other damages.
recent watershed holding in Massachusetts - which states that plaintiffs have standing to bring suit for global warming damages - could
open the federal courts to such suits for years to come.2 7

Some observers credit the spike in global warming litigation
to the failure of the federal government to regulate the emissions of

greenhouse gases.28 Several commentators, moreover, have argued
that civil torts against the largest contributors of CO 2 will fill the void
of state and federal regulation. 29 If courts allow civil suits related to
global warming to proceed - which Massachusetts appears to dictate
- the largest corporate emitters could be on the hook for enormous
Some commentators compare these companies' potential
damages.
liability to damages suffered by tobacco companies' resulting from
litigation brought during the 1990s. 3 The $300 billion settlement tobacco manufacturers paid out to states' attorneys general for healthcare costs could be quite small, however, compared to the damages
California v. General Motors Corp., No. 3:06CV05755, * 13 (N.D. Cal.
filed Sept. 20, 2006).
26Id. at 9-12.
25

27

See Adler, supra note 2.

Peter Lattman, Global Warming & the Law, Law Blog, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24,
2006, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/1 0/24/global-warming-the-law/.
29 See David A. Grossman, Warming Up To A Not-So Radical Idea: Tort28

Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003); Denis Culley,
Global Warming, Sea Level Rise and Tort, OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 91 (2002);
Eduardo M. Penalver, Acts of God or Toxic Torts? Applying Tort Principlesto the
Problem of Climate Change, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 563 (1988); Seth A. Northrop,
Exporting EnvironmentalJustice by Importing Claimants: The Suitability and Feasibility of the Globalizationof Mass Tort Class Actions, GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv.
779 (2006).
30 The Lawyers, supra note 7.
31 See Bill McKibben, Is CorporateDo-Goodery For Real?, MOTHER JONES,
Nov./Dec. 2006, available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2006/1 I/
hypevshope.html (discussing prediction by Goldman Sachs analyst that global
warming liabilities could equal those suffered by tobacco industry); see also The
Lawyers, supra note 7; and also Swiss Re, Emission Reductions: Main Street to
Wall Street: The Climate in North America, Synthesis of Conference Program and
Workshops (2002), available at http:www.unionre.ch/INTERNET/pwswpspr.nsf/
alldocbyidkeylu/CRON-5A7SX8.
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sought by a coalition of states alleging loss of
32 coastline, drinking water, and other seemingly catastrophic losses.
Directors and officers of the largest emitters of greenhouse
gases could also be vulnerable to litigation. 33 Some groups have argued that officers and directors would be lax in their fiduciary duties
in failing to address possible liability stemming from greenhouse gas
emissions. 34 Indeed, there already is significant evidence of shareholder concern over climate change.35 Shareholders introduced 19
resolutions on the subject of climate change at annual corporate
36
shareholder meetings in 2002. Resolutions at General Electric and
American Electric Power received support from 23 and 27 percent of
voting shareholders, respectively. 37 Interestingly, a 2002 shareholder
proposal at Exxon Mobil argued that the then chairman and CEO's
threatened the company's repustatements regarding global warming
38
tation and shareholder value.
As the clouds of litigation loom over the energy industry, it is
not surprising that significant concern has gripped another of the nation's largest industries: insurers. 39 One example: the world's second
largest re-insurer, Swiss Re, has begun treating climate change as a
liability risk.40 Courts and policymakers will confront myriad complex legal issues as litigation for global warming proceeds, but none
may be more significant for consumers than whether insurers - or energy companies, among others - pay for decades of harmful emissions. The issue is particularly significant given the sensitivity of the
global economy to energy prices, which would almost certainly be

32

The Lawyers, supra note 7.

33 See J. Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It's Not Just a
Policy Issue for CorporateCounsel - It's a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.

89 (2004); Elizabeth E. Hancock, Red Dawn, Blue Thunder, Purple Rain: Corporate Risk Of Liability For Global Climate Change And The SEC Disclosure Dilemma, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 233 (Winter 2005).
34 Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, Executives Could

Face Liability Over Climate Change, Nov. 2, 2002,
http://www.ceres.org/newsroom/newsletters_02 nov-dec.htm.
35 See Healy & Tapick, supra note 33, at 105.
Id.

36
37

1Id. at 106.

38 Hancock, supra note 33, at 250.
39 Healy & Tapick, supra note 33, at 102.
40 id,

available

at

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 19:4

dramatically affected by massive litigation. 4'

III. DISCUSSION OF CASES
Observers have broken down global warming litigation into
several general categories, ranging from suits brought against government agencies for failure to comply with congressional legislation,
to civil nuisance suits brought by private litigants.42 This article is
primarily concerned with• the prospect
•
43 of public and private civil suits
stating causes of action for nuisance. However, because some cases
regarding compliance with the Clean Air Act ("CAA") and the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") shed considerable light
on the issue of insurance coverage, I will canvass the relevant issues
they present.
A. CLEAN AIR ACT LITIGATION
A watershed environmental law case recently decided by the
US Supreme Court confronted two of the most significant legal issues
regarding global warming: 1) the threshold requirement for standing;
and 2) whether the Environmental Protection Agency has authority to
regulate greenhouse gases. 44 The first issue was arguably the most
important, given that a finding against standing would likely have
shuttered plaintiffs' efforts to sue for global-warming related damages in federal court. 45 The Court decided the case in favor of the
state and municipal plaintiffs on each point, however, holding that
Massachusetts had standing to bring suit, and that the EPA had authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA. 46

On the standing issue, the EPA had argued that the widespread harm wrought by global warming did not amount to the kind
41Tyson Slocum, Hot Profits and Global Warming: How Oil Companies Hurt
Consumers and the Environment, PUBLIC CITIZEN, Sept. 2006, available at

http://www.citizen.org/documents/HotProfitsGlobalWarming.pdf(last visited May
16, 2007).
42 Pidot, supra note 21, at 1.
43

See, e.g., General Motors, No. 3:06CV05755 at 13.

44 Massachusetts, at * 10-11 (U.S. 2007) (citing DC Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision holding in Massachusettsv. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
45 See generally Blake R. Bertagna, "Standing" Up for the Environment: The
Ability of Plaintiffs to Establish Legal Standing to Redress Injuries Caused by
Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. REv. 415, 441-42 (2006).
46 Massachusetts, 2007 WL 95733, at * 22.
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of particularized injury a plaintiff must show to achieve standing.4 7
The Court disagreed.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
stated that Massachusetts, among other states, possessed "quasisovereign interests" in protecting its land and citizens from global
warming. 49 Massachusetts also could bring suit, the Court held, in
order to protect its interests as a major landholder.50 "Because the
Commonwealth owns a substantial portion of the state's coastal
property," the majority opinion reasoned, "it
has alleged a particular51
ized injury in its capacity as a landowner."
The state's interest in bringing the suit was not minimized,
according to the Court, because the primary risk of rising sea levels
was widely shared among states and real property owners. Nor was
the Court concerned by the likelihood that regulation by the EPA
would only slow
or reduce plaintiffs' injuries, rather than entirely
53
them.
eliminate
Regarding its ability to regulate greenhouse gases, the EPA
argued that 1) it lacked congressional authority and 2) even if it had
such authority, it properly decided not to regulate. 54 Congress first
mentioned carbon dioxide in the CAA in the 1990 amendments. 55
However, Congress went out of its way in the amendments, the EPA
argued, to say that the EPA only had non-regulatory authority over
the substance, and that nothing in the section could provide a basis
for air pollution control requirements. 56 Indeed, the 6 separate statutes in which Congress addressed the issue of global warming only
advise Congress to study the issue, not to regulate. 57 As counsel for
EPA stated in oral argument before the Supreme Court, "Congress
did not intend to hide elephants in mouse holes" by failing to promulgate specific regulation of greenhouse gases, which are a direct

47

1Id. at 13.
48 id.
49

Id.

at 17.

' 0 Id.
at

19-20.

S'Id.

5Id.at 19.
53
54

Id. at 22.
Id.at 8.

55Massachusetts,415 F.3d at 70.
56 Id.
57Id.
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product of about 85 percent of the national economy. 58
The Court also disagreed with the EPA's conclusions regarding the CAA, holding that the legislation's plain meaning permitted
regulation. 59 The CAA's definition of air pollutant was sweeping and
comprehensive, according to Stevens, and clearly embraced "all airborne compounds of whatever stripe."6 Congressional failure to
regulate greenhouse gases did not, according to the Court, alter the
EPA's original mandate under the CAA to regulate "any air pollutant" that may endanger the public welfare. 6 1 The Court concluded
that the EPA could only refuse a petition to regulate greenhouse
gases after determining that greenhouse gases do not contribute to
climate change, or by providing a reasonable explanation of why it
could not make a determination.
The effect of the Court's decision on the future of global
warming litigation is difficult to overstate. 63 Indeed, one commentator has predicted that the Court's holding would ensure "that federal
courts will play a role in [the climate-change debate] for years to
come. '64 Although the decision will undoubtedly pressure the EPA
to regulate greenhouse gases, the opinion does not require such action. Moreover, even if the EPA chooses to regulate, it would retain considerable discretion in delaying such regulation for several
years. 66 The Court's decision on standing, alternatively, could usher
in a period of extensive civil litigation over global warming. 67 Because the Court's opinion arguably confers standing on large landholders - as well as the 50 states - prospective plaintiffs could range

from ski resorts suffering from fewer snow days to coastal golf reTranscript of Oral Argument at 47-48, Massachusetts, 126 S.Ct. 2960 (No.
05-1120).
58

59 Massachusetts,2007 WL 95733, at * 10-11.
60

Id. at 26.

61

Id. at 27.

62

Id. at 30.
63 See Adler, supra note 2.
64

id.
65 Mark Moller, DiscussionBoard: Did The Court Raise a "High Bar"?, SCOTUSblog.com, April 3, 2007, available at, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/achives/2007/04/discussionboar_4.html.
66

Id.

67 Jack Balkin, Standing and Executive Power in Massachusetts v. EPA,
Balkinization, April 3, 2007, available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/
standing-and-executive-power-in.html (last visited May 16, 2007).
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68
sorts threatened by increasing sea levels and sea-borne storms.

B. NEPA ENFORCEMENT
Before the Supreme Court decided whether a plaintiff could
bring suit for global warming, one federal court already had held that
a plaintiff established standing by alleging that global warming
threatened real property that he owns and uses. 6 9 In its holding, the
Northern District of California denied summary judgment to two
government-agency defendants, the Export Import Bank 7 'EIB") and
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC").7 Plaintiffs
argue the agencies violated the National Environmental Policy Act,
by failing to evaluate the potential global warming impacts within the
US of the projects they finance overseas.71 (Between 1990 and 2001,
the EIB provided more than $25 billion in loans and financial guarantees to overseas energy projects that produce 204 million tons of CO 2
annually; OPIC supported projects between 1990 and 2000 that emitted more than 56 million tons of CO 2 annually.) 72 The agencies
counter that NEPA does not ally to general environmental harms to
the US that originate overseas.
The court held that "it was reasonably probable that emissions
from projects supported by OPIC and Ex-Im will threaten plaintiffs'
concrete interests. 74 Therefore, the court found that the plaintiffs,
including Greenpeace and the cities of Boulder, Co. and Oakland,
Calif., had standing to bring their claims.75 In support of its decision,
the court cited evidence that projects financed by the defendants con76
tributed 8 percent of global CO 2 emissions. Furthermore, the court
held that plaintiffs' injury was redressable if the agencies' decisions
to fund the projects could merely be influenced by a global warming

68

id.

See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal.
2005), sub nom Friendsof the Earth,Inc. v. Mosbacher.
7
°Id. at *1.
69

71

id.
Pidot, supra note 21, at 13.

72
73

Friends of the Earth, 2005 WL 2035596, at *1.

74

Id. at *2.

75

Id. at *3.

76Id. at *3.
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77

C. NUISANCE LITIGATION
Other claims, however, have failed to advance beyond the
pleading stage.7 8 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed a nuisance claim brought by 8 states, the city of New
York, and several land trusts against the 5 largest CO 2 emitters in the
US. 79 Defendants operate 174 fossil-fuel powered power plants that
emit about 650 million tons of CO 2 annually. 80 Plaintiffs argued that
the plants constituted a public nuisance, because they contribute
about one quarter of the nation's electric power sector's CO 2 emissions.8 1 The plaintiffs further alleged that US electric power plants
are responsible for 102percent of world wide CO 2 emissions resulting
from human activity.
They asked that defendants be held jointly and severally liable, that the court enjoin each defendant to abate its emissions, and
that the court require each to reduce its emissions by a specific percentage over the next decade.8 3 The court held, however, that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim, citing the "political question"
84
doctrine.
Because deciding the case would have required the court
to have made an "initial policy determination" it believed the judicial
branch was not suited to make, the court dismissed the suit.8' The
political branches, according to the court, would have to take up the
issue in order for it to be resolved in the fashion desired by plaintiffs. 86 The court announced its holding before the Supreme Court's
ruling in Massachusetts.
California's suit against the automakers, alternatively, seeks

77
78

Id. at *4.
See Connecticut v. Am. Electric Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.

2005).
79

Id. at 267.

80

Pidot, supra note 21, at 15.

"' Connecticut, 406 F.Supp.2d at 268.
82 Id.
83

Id. at 270.

84 Id. at 272.
85

Id.

86

Id.
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billions of dollars in damages. The state is also seeking a declaratory judgment stating that the carmakers are liable for all future damages arising from greenhouse gases emitted by their products.8 8 California alleges in its September 2006 complaint that defendants'
emissions comprise 9 percent of the world's CO 2 emissions, and
more than 30 percent of emissions from sources in California.89 The
case could be a bellwether of states' attorneys general efforts to combat global warming through the courts. Oil and coal producers, alternatively, have become targets of private litigants. 90 The suit brought
against 8 named oil companies, 100 unnamed oil companies, and 31
coal companies for damages resulting from Katrina, however, is not
likely to survive defendants' motion to dismiss. 91 In its holding on an
earlier motion, the court stated that plaintiffs faced "daunting evidentiary problems" in proving by a preponderance of the evidence "the
degree to which global warming is caused by the emission of greenhouse gasses ...and the extent to which the emission of greenhouse
gasses by these defendants ...

intensified or otherwise affected the

weather system that produced Hurricane Katrina. ' , 92 The Supreme
Court's recent expansion of its standing doctrine in Massachusetts,
however, could significantly alter the landscape of this and other litigation.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION EXCLUSIONS
A. THE 1973 POLLUTION EXCLUSION
At the close of the 1960s, the insurance industry began to respond to its growing exposure to liabilities resulting from environmental pollution. 93 Part of its problem lay in the general nature of the
coverage it granted its policyholders.9 4 The title of its standard cov87

GeneralMotors, No. 3:06CV05755) at *3.

88

Id. at 3.

89

Id.at 2.

90

See Comer, 2006 WL 1066645, at *4.

9' Id.

at4.

92 Id.

Richard D. Williams, Intent of The Drafters: The Pollution Exclusion and
the Insurance CommisserDocuments, 579 PLI/Comm 415, 415 (May-June 1991).
94 R. Stephen Burke, PollutionExclusion Clauses: The Agony, the Ecstasy, and
the Irony for Insurance Companies, Comment, 17 N. Ky. L. Rev. 443, 447 (Winter
93
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erage, the Comprehensive General Liability policy, suggested maximum coverage for the full gamut of liabilities for third-party damages. 95 The critical limitation of coverage had been the requirement
that covered risks be "caused by an accident.', 96 Insurers and courts
had widely understood this requirement to mean that insurers would
not cover risks voluntarily assumed by the insured, nor risks the insured knowingly or intentionally incurred. 97 In 1966, insurers responded to demand for broader coverage by offering coverage for an
"occurrence," which it defined as an "accident, including continued
or repeated exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy
period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured., 98 This language ostensibly would cover a manufacturer's continuous release of pollution, as
long as the manufacturer
did not intend harm to result to third parties
99
release.
the
of
by way
However, Congressional efforts to combat air and water pollution, as well high-profile liabilities resulting from environmental
disaster, soon prompted insurers to attempt to limit this coverage.'00
The industry developed and promulgated a new exclusion for: ...
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies,
toxic chemicals, liquids, or gases, waste materials or other irritants,
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any
water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental. 1°1
Insurers added the wording to CGL policies in 1973.02 The
exclusion appeared to indicate a significant reduction of coverage.103
While the pre-exclusion CGL policy covered continuous release of
pollution, the exclusion appeared to withdraw coverage for any occurrence that was not "sudden," perhaps implying a limitation on the
1990).
95 Id..

96

Id. at 448.

97 Id.
98

Id.

99 Id.

'00

Id. at 449.

101Williams, supra note 93, at 417.
102

Burke, supra note 94, at 450.

103

Id.
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length of time and frequency of release. ° 4 Moreover, while the CGL
policy denied coverage only in the event of intentional harm to third
parties, the exclusion appeared to deny coverage
for harm to third
05
1
release.
intentional
any
from
arising
parties
Despite this seemingly significant change, the insurance industry represented the exclusion as a mere clarification and continuation of coverage under the CGL policy.' 0 6 The Insurance Rating
Board, an industry rating and drafting organization, submitted memoranda to state insurance commissioners that would have given these
regulators little reason to withhold their approval of the exclusion.
The memorandum submitted to the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner, for example, provides:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in
most cases under present policies because the damages can be said to
be expected or intended and thus are excluded by the definition of
occurrence. The above exclusion clause clarifies this situation so as
to avoid any question of intent. Coverage is continued for pollution
or contamination caused injuries when the pollution or contamination
107
results from an accident ....
The Commissioner entered an order approving the new exclusion, stating that the new exclusions "are merely clarification of existing coverages as defined and limited in the definitions of the term
'occurrence'. ...108 Several other examples of memoranda submitted to state insurance commissioners, and commissioners' responses
to those memoranda, demonstrate that the same understanding between the industry and regulators existed in many states.10 9
The debate over the meaning of the exclusion has since been
the focus of considerable litigation, legal analysis, and judicial opinions.'10 Early cases addressing the meaning of the 1973 pollution ex-

104Id.
105
Id.
106 Williams, supra note 93, at 423-28.
107

Id. at 424-25.

108Id.

at 427.

'09 See generally EUGENE ANDERSON, JORDAN S. STANZLER & LORELIE S.
MASTERS, INSURANCE LITIGATION COVERAGE, 2D. ED., ASPEN PUBLISHERS,

15-49

- 15-53 (2006).
110 See Morton Int'l., Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 855
(N.J., 1993) (stating "an enormous outpouring of judicial energy already has been
expended in attempting to fathom how this exclusion should be interpreted.").
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clusion overwhelmingly favored policyholders." 1 Between 1981 and
1986, 27 of 35 pollution exclusion cases resulted in holdings favorable to the insured.' 1 2 These holdings generally were based on one of
two methods of interpretation." 3 Courts in Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Washington, for
example, have looked at the industry's portrayal of the exclusion to
regulators as an indication of the original intent behind the exclusion.114 The New Jersey Supreme Court, for one, stated that [enforcing the plain meaning of the exclusion]
would contravene this State's public policy requiring regulatory approval of standard industry-wide policy forms to assure fairness in rates and in policy content, and would condone the industry's
misrepresentation to regulators in
5 New Jersey and other states concerning the effect of the clause. 1
According to the New Jersey Court, the insurer was estopped
from asserting an interpretation of the 1973 exclusion that contradicted statements made by the insurance industry in promoting the
exclusion to state regulators.' 16 This was particularly necessary,
given that policyholders continued to pay the same premiums, despite
an alleged reduction in coverage.l 1
But policyholders have not solely relied on this theory of
"regulatory estoppel" in litigating the meaning of the exclusion. 118
Standard doctrines of insurance policy interpretation also have provided a reasonable basis for coverage under the exclusion. 1 9 First,
under the doctrine of contra proferentem, ambiguities in contracts are
construed against the drafter, typically the insurer. 120 This is the case
...
Burke, supra note 94, at 455.
112 id.

113

See generally Amy Timmer, Are They Lying Now or Were They Lying

Then? The Insurance Industry's Ambiguous Pollution Exclusion: Why the Insurer,
and Not the Innocent Insured,Should Payfor Pollution Caused by PriorLandowners, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 355, 363-65 (Spring 1994).
114

Id. at 363.
115 Morton Int'l., Inc., 629 A.2d at 848.
116

id.

117

Id. at 852-53.

118

Timmer, supra note 113, at 373.

119 Id.
120

Scott G. Johnson, Resolving Ambiguities In Insurance Policy Language:

The Contra Proferentem Doctrine and Use of Extrinsic Evidence, 33 A.B.A. THE
BRIEF 33 (Winter 2004).
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because, unlike a negotiated business contrac insurance policies use
standardized language drafted by the industry. 1 A second basis for
22
policyholder coverage is the reasonable expectations doctrine.
This doctrine requires that an insurance policy be interpreted in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured 23 The doctrine applies regardless of whether the policy language is ambiguous
or clear - it simply asks: "Would a reasonable insured in this position
expect coverage? 124 From one point of view, the doctrine essentially provides a public policy basis for modifying contracts when the
25
plain language does not comply with the court's sense of justice.
As of 1996, 38 states recognized the reasonable expectations doctrine.12 6 Finally, courts also accept the general proposition that a previous holding regarding the meaning of contract terminology is presumed to be the meaning
of the same terminology written into a later
27
insurance policy. 1
There are several justifications for these canons of policy interpretation. 28 First, insurance policies are "contracts of adhesion"
29
which prompt the court to place the onus of clarity on the insurer.'
Second, these canons give insurers an incentive to draft clear policy
language, which ultimately reduces litigation over coverage.
Moreover, as a matter of public policy, forfeiture of coverage is dis-

121

Id.

122 Melody A. Hamel, The 1970 Pollution Exclusion in Comprehensive General Liability Policies: Reasons for Interpretationsin Favor of Coverage in 1996
and Beyond, Comment, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 1083, 1106 (Summer 1996). Many com-

mentators cite Prof. Robert Keeton's 1970 article in the Harvard Law Review as
the inception of the doctrine. Keeton asserted the proposition in the article that "the
reasonable expectations of applications and intended beneficiaries will be honored
even though a painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations." Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961 (1970).
124 Id.

125 John M. Bjorkman, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Overview,
Brief 29 A.B.A. THE BRIEF 38, 39 (Summer 2000).
126 See Hamel, supra note 122, at 1107.
121Id.at 1094-95.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130Id.
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favored. 131
Perhaps the greatest source of ambiguity in the 1973 exclusion is the requirement that the release of pollution be "sudden and
accidental" in order for coverage to exist._32 To resolve the issue,
some courts pointed to holdings previous to 1970 that held "sudden
and accidental" in boiler and machinery policies to mean "unexpected and unintended." 133 Furthermore, many federal courts of appeal have held that a reasonable meaning of "sudden" is "unexpected," and therefore the "sudden and accidental" requirement is
ambiguous and must be resolved in favor of the insured. 134 The
Georgia Supreme Court's discussion of "sudden" is often cited in
pro-policyholder opinions:
[O]n reflection, one realizes that, even in its popular usage,
"sudden" does not usually describe the duration of an event, but
rather its unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in the road,
sudden death. Even when it is used to describe the onset of an event,
the word has an elastic temporal
connotation that varies with expecta35
tions: Suddenly, it's spring.
Insurers argue, alternatively, that because "accidental" commonly means "unexpected and unintended," construing "sudden" to
mean the same would render the phrase a mere redundancy. 136 Following this logic, many courts have held that the exclusion is unambiguous, and should be interpreted to bar coverage for damage resulting from gradual environmental pollution. 137 A federal district court
applying Kansas law, for example, rejected' 38the argument that sudden
could be construed to mean "unexpected."'
131 John S. Vishneski, III et al., The Insurance Industry's 1970 Pollution Exclusion: An Exercise in Ambiguity, 23 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 67, 72 (Fall 1991).
132 id.

133

Hamel, supra note 122, at 1094.

134

See, e.g., New Castle County v. HartfordAccident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d

1162, 1198 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds; BroderickInv. Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601, 608 (10th Cir. 1991); Avondale Indus., Inc.
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1204-06 (2d Cir. 1989); Benedictine Sisters of St. Mary's Hosp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1209, 1210-

12 (8th Cir. 1987).
135 Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989).
136

See, e.g., Trico Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 853 F.Supp. 1190, 1193

(C.D. Cal. 1994); Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 810 F.Supp. 1406,

1411 (D. Del. 1992); Sokoloski v. Am. West Ins. Co., 980 P.2d 1043 (Mont. 1999).
137 Anderson, supra note 109, at 15-77.
138 Am. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987).
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No use of the word 'sudden' or 'suddenly' could be consistent
with an event which happened gradually or over an extended period
of time, nor could it39be consistent with an event which was anticipated or predictable.1
B. THE 1986 POLLUTION EXCLUSION
During the mid-1980s, the insurance industry adopted broader
pollution exclusion language. 140 The industry drafted the new exclusion because of concern over judicial decisions holding that the 1973
exclusion' 4 ' did not preclude coverage for continuous or gradual pollution. 142 Insurers also were concerned that they would be required to
indemnify numerous policyholders for enormous liabilities under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 143 Adopted by Congress in 1980, CERCLA
regulated existing, inactive, and abandoned hazardous waste.'"n The
legislation also 45
held a range of parties strictly liable for cleanup and
response costs. 1
At first, insurers naturally fought to deny coverage for these
liabilities. 46 Over time, however, they crafted the new exclusion to
explicitly eliminate coverage for liabilities resulting from the unintentional, but prolonged release of pollutants. 147 According to one commentator, a review of the published proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") between 1980 and
1988 revealed that the industry developed the exclusion solely for the
purpose of addressing CERCLA-type liability. 148 Indeed, written
communications from the American Insurance Association ("AIA")
13 9 Id. at 1428-29.
140 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason And Pollution: Correctly Construing the "Ab-

solute" Exclusion in Context and in Accord with its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (Fall 1998).
141See infra pp. 13-19.
142
14 3

Stempel, supra note 140, at 5.
Id.

144 Theresa Gooley, The Changing Environment: Interpreting the Pollution
Exclusion in the Context of CERCLA Liability, Note, 44 DRAKE L. REv. 153
(1995).
145 Id. at
146

154.
Stempel, supra note 140, at 5.

147 Id.
148Anderson,

supranote 109, at 15-97.
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to the NAIC and the Treasury Department solely 49evinced a concern
1
with liability to insurers resulting from CERCLA.
The standard form CGL policy's "absolute" pollution exclusion has since denied coverage for bodily injury or property damage
"arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release, or escape of pollutants."' 5 0 The standard
form policy's definition of pollutant also is quite broad. 5 ' Like the
1973 pollution exclusion, the 1986 exclusion has been the subject of
intense legal debate and litigation. 152 While insurers generally argue
that the exclusion eliminates coverage for all toxic torts causing thirdparty property damage or bodily injury, policyholders often contend
the exclusion is limited to long-term environmental pollution of the
type CERCLA was meant to regulate. 153 Many courts have since
held that the exclusion eliminates coverage even for abrupt, unexpected releases. 154 Courts across the US 55
remain divided, however,
over the type of pollution that is excluded.
In examining the eight enumerated pollutants in the exclusion,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals commented that they "collectively bring to mind byproducts of industrial pollution."'1 5 6 Moreover, the Supreme Court of California has held that "the broadening
of the pollution exclusion was intended primarily to exclude traditional environmental pollution rather than all injuries from toxic substances. ' 157 The Illinois Supreme Court stated, similarly, that it
would be remiss "to simply look to the bare words of the exclusion,
ignore its raison d' 5tre, and apply it to situations which do not remotely resemble traditional environmental contamination." 158 Even
149 1Id. at

15-97.

0

15 Id.
151 Id.

"[A]ny solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, includ-

ing smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste."
152 See, e.g., Porterfield v. Audubon Indem. Co., No. 1010894, 2002 WL
31630705, at *10 (Ala. 2002) (commenting that "[r]arely has any issue spawned as
many, and as variant in rationales and results, court decisions as has the pollution
exclusion clause.").
153 Stempel, supra note 140, at 5.
154 Id.
155

Id.

156 Richardson v. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310, 325 (D.C. 2003) (citing W.
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Gill, 686 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Mass. 1997).
157 MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205, 1210 (Cal. 2003).
158Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 81 (111. 1997).
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though the exclusion omits the previous requirement that the release
occur on land, in a body of water, or into the atmosphere, courts have
held that such an omission
cannot change the overall environmental
59
1
exclusion.
the
of
nature
Other courts have looked more closely at the plain meaning of
the exclusion, and held that it applies to virtually any release of a pollutant, regardless of whether the pollution originated in an industrial
context, or even if it occurred indoors.' 60 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected a policyholder's argument that the exclusion did not
apply to releases occurring indoors. 1 The court concluded that the
exclusion "does not limit its application to only those discharges
causing environmental harm; in contrast, it speaks broadly of
'[I]iability for any bodily or personal injury.' 6J62 Some courts have
gone so far as to extend the exclusion to liabilities resulting from exposure to lead paint. A Minnesota appeals court, for example, held
that "the chipping and flaking of lead paint qualifies as a 'discharge,'
'dispersal,' or 'release.' ,,163 Alternatively, others have ruled in favor
of the insured, holding that the exclusion is ambiguous
regarding
164
coverage for incidents such as lead paint ingestion.
An important aspect of interpretation for some courts in determining ambiguity has been the sheer lack of agreement among
courts in general.' 6 These courts recognize that the pollution exclusion is de facto ambiguous, simply because so many courts have interpreted it so differently. 6 6 Moreover, several documents written
around the time of the exclusion's adoption, point to confusion within
67
the insurance industry itself regarding its application and scope.1
The Independent Insurance Agents of America, for example, criti-

'9

Belt PaintingCorp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 795 N.E.2d 15, 20-21 (N.Y. 2003).

160 See, e.g., Assicurazioni Gen. S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997, 1004-05 (4 th Cir.

1998); IKO Monroe, Inc. v. Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Canada,Inc., No. 00834, 2001 WL 1568674, at * 4-5 (D. Del. 2001).
161 Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. C.A. Turner Const. Co., 112
F.3d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 1997).
162 Id.

163 Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 588 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. App. 1999).
' 64 Lititz Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steely, 785 A.2d 975, 981 (Pa. 2001).
165 William

P. Shelley & Joshua A. Mooney, Toxic Torts And The Absolute

Pollution Exclusion Revisited, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 55 (Fall 2003).
166 See, e.g., Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 624 (Md. 1995); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc., 926 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
167 Anderson, supra note 109, at 15-106.
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cized the exclusion in 1985 and 1986 on the grounds that it could be
168
interpreted to exclude coverage for an accidental or "hostile" fire.
Hence, many courts have found coverage, ruling that the exclusion is
ambiguous in light of the facts of the
169 specific case, and therefore
must be construed against the insurer.
Noting that a literal application of the exclusion would encompass the release of carbon monoxide from a small business
owner's delivery truck - and other "absurd results" - the Supreme
170
Court of Louisiana also held that the exclusion was ambiguous.
The court stated that in interpreting the exclusion, it would look at the
realities which precipitated the need for the pollution exclusions "the federal government's war on active polluters."' 71 The Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, moreover, held that "heating oil" is not a
pollutant within the meaning of the exclusion, because 1) the pollution exclusion never mentioned heating oil and 2) neither CERCLA
nor its Pennsylvania equivalent specifically excluded petroleum
' 72
products from their definitions of "pollutant" and "contaminant.'
C. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING
INTERPRETATION
Analysis of these exclusions will often require examination of
73
several other standard insurance doctrines and coverage provisions. 1
The "suitability principle" - adopted by the Supreme Court in 1828 holds that an insurance company is deemed to have sold a policy
suitable for the policyholder's standard operations. 174 Under the
principle, tort liabilities resulting from a company's standard opera1 75
tions are generally covered, regardless of applicable exclusions.
168 Id.

See, e.g., Lansing Bd of Water & Light v. U.S. Fid & Guar. Co., No.
160059, 1995 WL 855425 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Gulf Metals Indus., Inc. v. Chi.
Ins. Co., 993 S.W.2d 800, 805-06 (Tex. App. 1999); Round Rock Plaza Venture v.
MarylandIns. Co., No. 03-95-00108-CV, 1996 WL 63956 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
170 Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 124-25 (La. 2000).
169

171
172

Id. at 127.
Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Epstein, No. Civ.A.03-6506, 2004 WL 2075038

(E.D.Pa. 2004).
173Anderson, supranote 109, at 15-119 - 15-167.
174 Buck & Hedrick v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 26 U.S. 151 (1828).
175John N. Ellison, Richard P. Lewis & Nicholas M. Insua, Recent Developments in the Law Regarding the "Absolute" and "Total" Pollution Exclusions, the
"Sudden and Accidental" Pollution Exclusion and Treatment of the "Occurrence"

2007]

Price of Emission

489

Other courts essentially apply the "suitability principle" by requiring
that a policyholder's insurance
cover liabilities arising out of its
"normal business operations"' 176
Insurers, alternatively, often rely on the so-called non-fortuity
177
doctrines of "known loss," "loss-in-progress," and "known risk."
The purpose of these doctrines is to preserve the fundamental tenet of
insurance that losses are contingent and not already known. 1 78 The
known loss doctrine is applied when the insured has knowledge of
the threat of an immediate economic loss and that loss is certain to
occur. 179 The loss-in-progress doctrine, according to one commentator, applies when the loss is still occurring when the policy becomes
effective.' 80 Although many insurers have asserted a "known risk"
defense to coverage, many courts have refused to follow this reasoning. 181
Moreover, courts generally distinguish between first- and
third-party insurance in applying these doctrines.'
Unlike firstparty insurance, third-party losses generally occur after the injurious
event, and only become a certainty or "known loss" if and when "the
multitude of contingencies associated with a determination of liabilit
are removed" by a legal determination of liability for damages.
Some courts, however, have determined that the known loss doctrine
precludes coverage if the insured knew or had reason to know of the
"substantial probability" of the relevant loss. 1 84 The Supreme Court
of Illinois, for example, held that an insured had knowledge that it
would suffer a probable loss when it received an 185
administrative order
from the EPA regarding pollutant contamination.
Definition, SK095 ALI-ABA 1 (June 16, 2005).
176

See, e.g. In re Hub Recycling, Inc., 106 B.R. 372 (D.N.J. 1989); Bentz v.

Mut. Fire, Marine & InlandIns. Co., 575 A.2d 795 (Md. App. 1990).
177 Anderson, supra note 109, at 15-136 - 15-138.6.
178 1Id. at 15-136.
179 Id. at 15-137.
180 Id.

181Id. citing Kenneth Abraham, EnvironmentalLiability Insurance, 144 (1991)
("[T]he mere fact that the insured knew of a risk at the time of purchase is not a basis, standing alone, for denying coverage of liability for harm resulting from risk.").
182

183

Id. at 15-138.1.
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., No. C.A. PC 92-5248, 1999 WL

813661 at *9 (R.I .Super. July 29, 1999).
184 Anderson, supra note 109, at 15-138.5.
185

OutboardMarine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1210-22
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Finally, many policyholders will be able to fall-back on an
additional grant of coverage within the standard CGL policy: indemnification for personal injury suffered by a third party. 86 Unlike insurance policy provisions covering bodily injury or property damage,
personal injury liability ("PIL") coverage generally is not subject to
pollution exclusions.1 8 The CGL policy generally defines "personal
injury" as "wrongful entry or eviction or other invasion of the right of
private occupancy."' 188 Several courts have held that causes of action
for trespass or nuisance constitute claims for "wrongful entry," and
therefore trigger a policyholder's PIL coverage. 189 Moreover, courts
have also determined that "the right of private occupancy" includes
the right to enjoyment free from interference. 190 Nuisance and trespass suits, according to modem legal theories, can be brought for acts
that interfere with such rights.1 91 Therefore, both aspects of PIL coverage likely will apply - depending on the facts of the case - to
claims sounding in nuisance and trespass. 192 Several courts have
found PIL coverage in the context of environmental pollution, either
holding that the grant of coverage is clear or that
1 93 it is ambiguous, and
have therefore construed in favor of coverage.'
V.

THE EXCLUSIONS & GLOBAL WARMING
LIABILITY

Stephen D. Susman of Susman Godfrey LLP defended Phillip
Morris Co. in the 1990s against tobacco lawsuits filed by numerous
(I11.
1992).
186

Edwin A. Skoch, PersonalInjury Liability Coverage for Environmental

Contamination Under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy: Is Migrating
Pollution a "Wrongful Entry or Eviction or Other Invasion of the Right of Private
Occupancy? ", 9 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 37, 40 (1995).
187 Id. at41.
188

18 9

Anderson, supra note 109, at 15-148.

Id.

190Id.
191Id.
192 Id.

193See,

e.g., Hirschberg v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas., 798 F. Supp. 600 (N.D.
Cal. 1992); Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City ofKeene, 898 F.2d 265 (1st Cir.
1990); Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund v. Westchester FireIns. Co., 976 F.2d 1037
(7th Cir. 1992); Blackhawk-Cent. City Sanitation Dist. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 856 F. Supp. 584, 590 (D. Colo. 1994).
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states' attorneys general. 94 Now, he is teaching a syrnosium on
global warming at the University of Houston Law Center.
He also
recently represented several Texas cities in their successful effort to
assure cleaner power plants, a victory he calls his "first climate
change lawsuit."' 196 Susman at first believed the states' theories
against the tobacco makers were bizarre at best.' 97 His past mistake
has influenced his current perception of the future of global warming
litigation: "It turns out' 9 8that I was the fool, and I'm not going to let
that take place again."'
The prospect of a tobacco-type mass tort hitting energy and
utility companies is, perhaps, directly tied to whether the federal government regulates greenhouse gas emissions. 99 But the fact that one
of the country's top trial lawyers has shifted his practice in anticipation of such litigation is just one significant sign that "regulation
through tort" may not be far off.200 It is no coincidence, moreover,
that many of the plaintiffs in current global warming litigation are
states of the Union.20 1 The central argument behind the Court's finding of standing for the plaintiffs in Massachusetts was what the court
called the states' "quasi-sovereign interests" in bringing suit. 20 2 In its
nuisance complaint against automakers, California similarly alleged
harm in the form of its melting snow pack, the loss of water supply, a
greater risk of flooding, as well as the loss of coastline.20 3
The Court's holding in Massachusetts arguably recognizes
that large landholders have standing to bring suit for global warming. 204 Yet if damages in the form of prospective harm to real property are deemed insufficiently concrete, a state might also be able to

194 The Lawyers, supra note

7.

195 Id.

196Susman Godrey L.L.P., Susman Godfrey Concludes Successful Pro Bono
Representation of Texas Cities in TXU Coal Plants Case, Feb. 28, 2007,
http://www.susmangodfrey.com/news/2007-02-TXUCoalCase.html
(last visited
Mar. 23, 2007).
197 The Lawyers, supra note 7.
19 8 Id.
199 Id.
200 id.

201 See infra Section III.
202 Massachusetts, 2007 WL 95733, at * 17.
203 GeneralMotors, No. 3:06CV05755, at * 13.
204 Massachusetts, 2007 WL 95733, at * 19-20.
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show damages related to the costs of implementing comprehensive
monitoring programs, as well as various prophylactic measures.2 °5
Moreover, states likely suffer more "uncertainty costs" than private
litigants, in that they are likely delaying or redesigning different policies or programs because of the possibility that the state will suffer
20 6
severe environmental damages resulting from global warming.
Because federal law arguably preempts states' ability to regulate
greenhouse gases, such a suit would provide an outlet for pseudoregulation. 2° Even if the court dismissed such a suit, it would provide a tool by which states could bring public pressure to bear on the
federal government to regulate. 208 A class action suit on the part of
US attorneys general - in the manner of the suit brought against tobacco makers during the 1990s - represents,
therefore, a reasonable
2 9
scenario for regulation through tort. U
Such "tobacco-like" litigation would likely allege state and
federal public nuisance claims in the fashion of California's complaint. 2 ' This is largely the case because nuisance is easier to prove
than negligence, and the elements of public nuisance are easier to
prove than those for private nuisance.
A representative of one state
attorney general already has intimated that states may soon2 adopt
the
12
tobacco litigation as a model for suing over climate change.
To be liable for a public nuisance, defendants must carry on,
or participate to a substantial extent in carrying on, activities that create an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general

205

GeneralMotors, No. 3:06CV05755, at *13.
206 For a discussion of the application of "uncertainty costs" as damages in pollution suits, see Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 Yale L.J. 647, 684 (1971); see also Daniel A.
Farber, UncertaintyAs A Basis ForStanding, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1123 (2005).
207 Transcript, supra note 58, at 16-17.
208

See The Lawyers, supra note 7.

209 Id.
210

Grossman, supra note 29, at 52.

211

Id.

See Healy & Tapic, supra note 33, at 101, (quoting a representative of a
state attorney general: "States have long used common law to protect their citizens,
and ... they are less restricted in doing so than private parties, as they are able to
direct lawsuits against public as well as private nuisances. Using the tobacco litigation as a model, states might sue major emitters to recover the costs of coping with
climate change: the costs of flooding, for example, or expenditures for the development of new water supplies.").
212
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public. 213 Second, defendants" interference with the public right
must be unreasonable.21 4 Unreasonableness can be established on
three independent and sufficient grounds: 1) defendants' conduct significantly interferes with the public safety, health, peace, comfort, or
convenience; 2) it is continuing conduct, or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and defendants know or have reason to
know that it has a significant effect upon the public right; or 3) defendants' conduct is unlawful.21 5
It is not difficult to see how a court or jury would find emitters of greenhouse gases to have carried on activities that create an
unreasonable interference with a public right. 216 Participating in an
activity that causes the melting of a state's snow pack arguably meets
this standard.21 7 Moreover, such conduct would arguably interfere
with public safety and health, and at the very least public comfort and
convenience. 2 18 The question remains, however, whether defendants'
post-1973 and post-1986
insurance policies would provide coverage
21 9
for their liabilities.
A. COVERAGE UNDER POST-1973 CGL POLICY
Under the plain meaning of the 1973 pollution exclusion, it is
uncertain whether CO 2 would fall under the list of excluded materials. 220 Although CO 2 might generally be considered a "waste material," it would not easily be classified as an irritant or contaminant.22'
Moreover, the EPA traditionally has stated that CO 2 is not a pollutant. 222 Yet policyholders should not have to rely on this aspect of the

213
214

Id.at 53.
Id.at 54.

2 15

id.
216

Id. at 53-54.

217

Healy & Tapic, supra note 33, at 53-54.

218

Id. at 54.

219

See infra Section IV.

220

See Williams, supra note 93.

221

Seth Borenstein, Bush Administration: Carbon Dioxide Not a Pollutant,
Knight
Rider
News
Service, Aug.
29,
2003,
available
at
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0829-02.htm (last visited May 16,
2007).
222

Id.
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exclusion in order to secure coverage. 22 3 By deferring to standard
doctrines of insurance policy interpretation, courts should construe
the exclusion in a manner favorable to the insured.22 4 First, courts
should follow the ruling of the Supreme Court of New Jersey by estopping any effort by an insurer to limit coverage bey'ond the scope of
coverage represented by the industry to regulators.
Even if courts
choose to honor the exclusion, however, they should recognize that
the meaning of the phrase "sudden and accidental" is susceptible to
varying interpretations and is inherently ambiguous. 226 Because ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the insured, 227
the exclusion
should be held inapplicable to suits for global warming.
Moreover, courts in most states honor the reasonable expectations of the insured.228 The Supreme Court of California, for example, created three factors by which courts could determine a policyholder's reasonable expectations: 1) the type of insurance purchased;
2) whether exclusionary language precisely describes what is excluded from coverage; and 3) the basis of the policyholder's liability,
including whether that liability arose out of the policyholder's normal
business operations. 22 9 Companies' CGL policies are intended to
provide the widest possible protection to policyholders.2 30 In addition, the 1973 pollution exclusion is ambiguous on its face, and its
meaning is further complicated by its regulatory history. 3 Companies' potential liability for CO 2 emissions, furthermore, will result
from their normal business activities; i.e, energy companies' raison
d'etra is to harvest fossil fuels, most utilities produce power by consuming fossil fuels, and nearly all automobiles work only by burning
fossil fuels.
A reasonable policyholder would expect coverage unless the
cause of the damage are "irritants or contaminants commonly thought

223 See Johnson, supra note 120; Hamel, supra note 122.
224

Id.

225 Morton Int'l, Inc., 629 A.2d. at 855.
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227 Johnson, supra note 120.
228 Hamel, supra note 122.

229 Mackinnon, 73 P.3d at 1210.
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of as... pollution.', 2 32 Whether a reasonable policy holder would
expect a particular irritant or contaminant to be environmental pollution can be determined by looking at the laws, if any, that regulate the
substance. 233 After the Supreme Court's recent holding in Massachusetts, a reasonable policyholder would at least have significant cause
for concern that greenhouse gases would constitute "irritants or contaminants commonly thought of as pollution., 234 Yet the debate over
policyholders' coverage for emissions occurring before Massachusetts - which would constitute the overwhelming bulk of their emissions - must focus on laws and regulations that preceded the decision.
First, the EPA traditionally has stated that CO 2 is not a pollutant.
Second, all direct references to CO 2 or global warming in the
236
CAA appear in nonregulatory provisions.
In addition, congressional acts that discuss the issue of global warming only instruct
agencies to study the issue.2 37 Indeed, Congress has several times rejected efforts to regulate greenhouse gases. 238 Yet Congress has chosen to regulate other atmospheric phenomenon, like acid rain, by assigning it a discrete title under the CAA. 2 3 9 Given this nonregulatory
posture on the part of the federal government, a reasonable policyholder prior to the decision in Massachusetts would have assumed
that its third-party insurance would cover claims for liabilities resulting from its greenhouse gas emissions.2 4 °
Finally, a liable corporate policyholder also should receive
coverage under its insurance for personal injury. 24 1 Many courts
have recognized that nuisance claims fall under the "wrongful entry"
and "any other invasion of the right of private occupancy" language

232
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233
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(2006).
240 See generally MacKinnon., 73 P.3d at 1205.
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in policies' coverage for PIL. 242 Additionally, courts have not hesitated to recognize PIL coverage for nuisance claims in the context of
pollution.2 4 3 Indeed, some courts have held that PIL coverage is trig
gered even without a tangible interference or invasion of property.
A public nuisance claim for damages resulting from global
warming, such as melting snow pack and loss of water supply - or
even uncertainty costs such as delayed construction of beachside realty - would arguably constitute a "wrongful entry" or "any other invasion of the right of private occupancy." The First Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that allegations alleging interference with quiet enjoyment of a homestead - because of noxious odors, noise and light
emanating from a sewage treatment plan - constituted an "invasion of
the right of private occupancy." 245 At the very least, several courts
have held that the term "wrongful entry" and "any other invasion..."
are ambiguous and require interpretation in favor of the policyholders.24 6 Therefore, even if courts fail to properly apply standard principles of insurance policy interpretation to post-1973 policies, PIL
coverage should provide a minimum level of insurance for liable
greenhouse gas emitters.
B. COVERAGE UNDER POST-1986 CGL POLICY
Liability resulting from the emission of greenhouse gases is
not the CERCLA-type liability the 1986 pollution exclusion was
meant to exclude. It is true that the pollution exclusion attempted to
address industrial environmental pollution.2 4 7 Large energy companies like Exxon Mobil, for example, have the capacity to generate industrial CERCLA-type pollution. 24 8 However, CO 2 emissions are of
a distinctly different character. 249 The difference is summed up, in
242

Id.

243

Id.

244

Town of Goshen v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 424 A.2d 822 (1980).

245 Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, New Hampshire, 898 F.2d
265, 273 (1st Cir. 1990).
246 Millers Mut. Ins. Ass 'n v. Graham Oil Co., 668 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996).
247 Anderson, supra note 109, at 15-97.
248 See, e.g., Press Release, Attorney General Andrew Cuomo to Sue Exxon
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(Feb.
8,
2007)
(at
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part, by a comment by the spokesperson for the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers: "Why would you regulate a pollutant," he asked
"that is an inert gas that is vital2 50to plant photosynthesis and that people exhale when they breathe?
CERCLA is concerned with preventing and cleaning up hazardous waste disposal sites. 2 5' Congress clearly hoped the legislation
would help prevent a repeat of environmental disasters like the Love
Canal and Times Beach incidents.25 2 Reclamation of hazardous
waste sites is a unique process with specific cleanup standards and
remedy selection procedures.2 5 3 The average reclamation cost of a
Superfund site under CERCLA is $20 million. 254 While the procedures for cleanup and the costs of remediation of a hazardous waste
site are relatively clear, they would appear to have little to no application in an effort to restrict greenhouse gas emissions, or reverse the
rise of sea levels or loss of snow pack. Nor has Congress attempted
to regulate global warming or climate change in a manner similar to
CERCLA, or even at all. 255 It seems clear, therefore, that courts
should not apply the expansive language of the exclusion to claims
related to global warming. The regulatory history of the 1986 pollution exclusion would seem to support this conclusion.2 5 6 In crafting
their new pollution exclusion, after all, insurers were almost exclusively concerned with preventing coverage for liability under
257
CERCLA.
Viewed in this light, the 1986 pollution exclusion is at best
ambiguous in regards to coverage for a public nuisance claim for
global warming. 58 The plain meaning of the exclusion is also ambiguous, because the EPA traditionally has stated that CO 2 does not
qualify as a pollutant.259 Since the exclusion only applies to pollut250 Id.
251
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ants, its application to a public nuisance suit for damages stemming
from emissions of CO 2 would be dubious at best in regards to preMassachusetts emissions. 260 The fissure among courts regarding the
meaning
of the exclusion also hints at the exclusion's ultimate ambi26
guity.

Like the analysis of the 1973 pollution exclusion, application
of the canons of insurance policy interpretation supports this conclusion. 262 A reasonable insured would not expect liability arising from
its normal business operations - i.e., emissions of greenhouse gases
from the burning of fossil fuels - to be excluded from coverage under its CGL policy. 263 The most important point undergirding these
expectations:
CO 2 emissions have never been regulated by Con264...
gress.
Insurers may argue in the alternative that liability for greenhouse gas emissions was a known loss, and therefore is exempt from
coverage. 265 For this theory to work, however, insurers must show
that liable companies knew or had reason to know of the "substantial
probability" of the relevant loss. 26 6 Target companies no doubt are
now aware of the possibility of losses related to global warming litigation. 26 7 To deny coverage for emissions occurring before the Supreme Court's recent decision, however, insurers would have to show
that these companies should have known there was a substantial
probability of losses from global warming litigation.26 8 Failing these
arguments, however, policyholders should receive PIL coverage under policies in which such coverage is provided.26 9

VI. IMPACT ON CONSUMERS
Requiring insurers to cover claims resulting from global
warming will ultimately benefit consumers by protecting the long-

260
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term stability of the national and global economy. 2 7 The oil industry
is experiencing record profits never before seen in corporate America. 27 Exxon Mobil, for example, reported an annual profit of $39.5
billion for 2006 - the company's second consecutive annual record.. The windfall marked the largest profit ever reported by a US
company. 27327Royal Dutch Shell reported profits of $25.44 billion,27 4
and ConocoPhillips reported profits of $15.55 billion.2 75 Moreover,
276
Between January
the oil industry has significant money to spare.
spent $112
largest
oil
companies
2005 and September 2006, the five
2
7
billion buying back stock and paying dividends. T Many politicians
and consumer advocates have called for a tax on energy profits, or
admonished these companies to devote more earnings to developing
alternative energy sources. 2778 Oil companies, therefore, appear able
to absorb significant financial penalties imposed by a lawsuit or set-

tlement.

279

Yet the insurance industry also is in a position of considerable
financial strength. 2 80 Despite Hurricane Katrina and other big storms
insurance companies made a record $44.8 billion profit in 2005.281
Moreover, the industry raised its surplus to about $427 billion - a 7
percent increase over the previous year. 282 Insurers performed so
270 Coy, supra note 5.
271
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well, according to some analysts, because they had previously distributed the risk of catastrophic losses to reinsurers.283 But others explain the industry's stability by citing a significant trend unfolding for
their expomore than 20 years: insurers have
284 significantly reduced
sure on various lines of coverage.
While insurers historically have covered about 60 percent of
losses under homeowners insurance, they inidisaster-related
total
tially only covered about 30 percent in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina.28 The industry also has significantly curtailed coverage under CGL policies.286 The original "comprehensive" general liability
policy contained only 5 exclusions. Today, there are a minimum of
15, as well as additional "endorsements" that contain more exclusions.287 The various iterations of pollution exclusions crafted by the
industry represent the most assertive effort to curtail insurers' exposure to risk.288 Despite these reductions in coverage, insurers have
continued to hike premiums. 289 Premiums for homeowners insurance,
have increased by more than half since the early
for example,
290
1990s.

Although energy companies and insurers appear flush with
cash, holding insurers responsible for coverage will ultimately benefit
First, these companies already have paid for thirdconsumers. 2
party liability coverage in the form of increasingly high premiums on
CGL policies. 292 Not allowing these companies to receive the benefit of their bargain would further undermine third-party liability insurance, thereby causing increasing premiums and litigation. 293 Disproportionate premiums and skyrocketing litigation costs ultimately
will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for both
energy and insurance.
283 Id.
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Furthermore, insurers already have evaluated the risks they
assumed in providing CGL coverage to their policyholders.294 They
are able to spread these risks - including that of global warming liability - through reinsurance or retain the risks by pooling policies
from similar policyholders.29 5 Although oil companies have enormous financial reserves, liabilities ranging from several billion to
hundreds of billions likely would significantly affect the pricing of
volatile consumer products like gasoline and heating oil. 296 Combined with slowing production in Latin America and Russia, and rising demand in China and India, billions in liabilities could result in
an enormous spike in oil prices. 29 7 Consumers would likely experience price hikes in airline tickets, at the pump, and in home heating
costs. 9 8 Therefore, these losses will more efficiently be spread
among various parties, and impact the marketplace and consumers
less severely, by assigning liability to insurers.
Significantly, insurance coverage for oil companies' liabilities
for global warming would not eliminate the deterrent effect of private
suits. 299 Oil companies would be forced to internalize part of the cost
of their past emissions in the form of deductible payments and higher
premiums on their insurance. 30 0 Of course, these costs also could be
passed on to consumers, but such costs would likely be significantly
reduced. Moreover, the application of insurance helps reduce moral
hazards; i.e., irresponsible corporate behavior. 30 1 In order to maintain
their coverage despite the arguable presence of a "known loss," major
greenhouse gas emitters will be forced to unilaterally reduce their
emissions to an acceptable level.30 2 This form of "voluntary" regulation is 4.rguably the most economically efficient, in that it does not
require federal regulation and allows the emitter to determine the

294
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30 3
most efficient way to reach acceptable emission levels.
In addition, growing anger regarding oil companies' record
profits supports the theory that suits related to global warming could
entail significant punitive damages. 30 4 As a matter of public policy,
however, most states do not allow insurers to cover punitive damages. 30 5 Therefore, it is possible that insurers' duty to indemnify their
policyholders will be significant reduced. Overall, it seems clear that
companies responsible for massive greenhouse gas emissions will
still be held accountable for their emissions, and will likely be forced
to dramatically reduce the emissions they cause.
Voluntary regulation could hurt consumers in the short term,
as companies implement costly technology and, perhaps, reduce production. However, it is difficult to conceive of a national response to
global warming that is equitable and effective, and that does not result in significant economic costs. The utility industry, for example,
already is considering a plan to pay for new carbon-dioxide-trapping
technology by increasing customers' rates by .05 cents per kilowatt
hour. 306 That would increase consumers' monthly electric bills by
about .5 percent, to $89.07 from $88.60.3o7 The worst case scenario
for consumers might be federal legislation that exempts the industry
from lawsuits, in exchange for its support of a national cap-and-trade
program. 308 Such a deal would not allow states to recoup their costs
related to global warming - thereby leaving taxpayers with the bill yet would still require corporate cutbacks affecting production and
prices. Consumers would arguably benefit by "regulation through
tort," therefore, because states would have the opportunity to recoup
some costs, and industry would be able to regulate itself in the most
efficient manner possible.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Global warming has become a subject of common interest and
concern in popular culture. 30 9 Energy companies appear to have
taken notice, as evidenced by a significant shift in their public state310
ments regarding global warming and its basis in human activities.
However, this about-face also is likely rooted in a surge in litigation
over global warming. 311 At least 16 cases are currently in state and
federal court, with plaintiffs seeking injunction and monetary damages, among other remedies. 312 Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision
in Massachusetts could significantly spur further litigation. 313 As the
clouds of litigation gather, and some commentators hint at the onset
of the next mass tort, insurers are taking notice. 314 Yet surprisingly
absent from the debate over global warming litigation thus far has
been discussion of whether companies are covered for damages resulting from civil suit.315 The question is significant, given the industry's historic practice of denying
claims for acts generally described
3
as environmental pollution. '
Since the early 1970s, the insurance industry has twice incorporated into its standard CGL policy new exclusions for liabilities resulting from pollution. 317 Policyholders, insurers and courts have
since expended an enormous amount of time and resources litigating
the meaning of these exclusions. 3 18 Many courts applying the strict
meaning of these exclusions have denied policyholders' coverage for
liabilities resulting from pollution. 31 9 Other courts, however, have
held that the exclusions are ambiguous, or that their application
would undermine a policyholder's reasonable expectation for cover309 See infra Section II.
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age.32°
It is not unlikely that emitters of greenhouse gases will ultimately face a public nuisance suit on the part of states' attorneys general, similar to the tobacco litigation brought against cigarette manufacturers in the 1990s. 32 1 If plaintiffs prevail on this or similar suits
then liable defendants should receive coverage under their standard
CGL policies. 322 This result is rooted in the original purpose of the
exclusions, the manner in which they were approved by state officials, their ambiguous wording, and the reasonable expectations of
policyholders. 323 Consumers ultimately will benefit from insurers assuming these liabilities, primarily because they are more able to
spread the liability by pooling policies or through reinsurance. 324 If
energy companies were saddled with the liability, however, prices on
a range of consumer products - from gasoline to airline tickets could spike dramatically. 325 Insurance coverage for liable parties
would also benefit consumers in that corporate emitters would be
326
This arforced to voluntarily reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
guably is a more preferable form of "regulation," in that the companies themselves are more likely to find the most efficient way to reduce emissions.327
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